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ONE THOUSAND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS. By Sheldon Glueck and Eleanor T.
Glueck. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1934. pp. xxix, 341.
THIs, the first volume of the Harvard Survey of Crime and Criminal Justice in
Boston, is an excellent study of the "work and worth of the Boston Juvenile Court,
one of the outstanding juvenile courts in the country, and of its scientific adjunct,
the Judge Baker Foundation, a children's clinic of distinguished repute",' by two
unusually competent and sophisticated criminologists. Their investigation of Court
and Clinic was conducted with substantially the same patient, careful, thorough and
ingenious methods which they themselves developed and employed in a prior study.2
After describing the structure and procedures of Court and Clinic, the authors
describe the environments and traits of a thousand delinquent boys who, at an
average age of thirteen years and five months,3 came before the Court and were
referred by the Court to the Clinic during the period 1917-1922. On the whole,
the picture is that of underprivileged and disadvantaged children of underprivileged
and disadvantaged parents. After examining each of these boys4 the Clinic advlsed
the Court whether he should be kept at home under probationary oversight; or
placed in a foster-home, with relatives, on a farm, or in military service; or placed
in a non-correctional institution; or committed to a correctional institution. 5 These
recommendations the Court followed fully in two-fifths and partially in another
two-fifths of the cases, and ignored in the remaining one-fifth.0 "As a rule, the
Clinic made two or three additional suggestions for treatment. These usually dealt
with improvement of health, educational needs, and vocational adjustments, and
with a miscellaneous assortment of matters designated as 'other constructive super-
vision"'.7 Of 2246 of these recommendations which the authors were able to follow
up, the Court observed one-fifth fully and two-fifths partially and disregarded the
remaining two-fifths.
8
It is apparent, as the authors say, that the bottles in the Clinic's medical chest
were few in number9 and also, as they show, that in providing for the treatment
of these delinquents the Court used these nostrums very sparingly.10
1. P. xxiii.
2. GLUECK AND GLUEcK, goo CpmlmrAL CARxxxs (1930). See also the authors' essay,
Predictability in the Administration of Criminal Justice (1929) 42 Hitv. L. Rrv. 297,
and Sheldon Glueck, Individualization and the Use of Predictive Devices (1932) 23
J. CRa n. L. 67.
3. P. 4.
4. Pp. 51-55.
5. Pp. 114, 231.
6. Pp. 119-22, 231.
7. P. 231. There were 2677 of these suggestions for the whole group, the modal num-
ber being 2.9. Pp. 115-117.
8. Pp. 129, 231-2.
9. P. 231.
10. In chapter VII the authors give the chief reasons why the Court did not follow
the Clinic's recommendations to a greater extent. In addition to differences of opinion
between Court and Clinic, which existed to some unascertainable extent, these reasons
were legal or procedural obstacles, lack of parental cooperation, refusal or inability of
various social agencies to assist the Court in the placement of certain delinquents, escape
of the delinquent or other lack of cooperation on his part, refusal or inability of public
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After recounting all this, the authors proceed to inquire into the behavior of this
group of delinquents during a period of five years following the treatment to which
they were subjected. Of the 923 boys about whose subsequent careers the authors
were able to get reliable information, 798 or 88.2% recidivated.11  Moreover, seven-
tenths of the recidivists were actually convicted of serious crimes and two-tenths
of minor offenses.12 Indeed, their record was on the whole much worse than that
of 422 older offenders, ex-inmates of the Massachusetts Reformatory, whose post-
treatment careers the authors examined in a prior study.1 3 The authors next attempt
to discover to what extent the recidivism of their delinquent group is attributable
to the Court's failure to follow the recommendations of the Clinic. Judged by a
comparison of the post-treatment behavior of the delinquents who were, and that
of the delinquents who were not, treated as the Clinic recommended, it made little
difference whether the Court did or did not follow the Clinic's prescriptions. The
most that the authors are able to say is that the carrying out of all the clinical
recommendations exercised some influence on the reformation of these delinquents.
14
Apparently, the judge's therapy was about as effective as that of the diniciansY5
This will surprise no one who understands the present status of criminology and
the wisdom of some experienced judges. As the authors say, the Clinic "has very
little specific evidence as to the value of any of the treatments it recommends for
different types of offenders; its prescriptions are essentially based on expectation
and not on proof."'1 6 The authors conclude that if the objective of Court and
Clinic was the reformation of the individual delinquent, as, of course, it vas in
large part, and if their success is to be measured by the delinquent's post-treatment
behavior, they largely failed to achieve their purpose.17
To those who have rather naively expected great things of children's clinics and
juvenile courts in the "cure" of delinquency, these findings will be shocking and
disheartening; and it is difficult to find comfort for them anywhere in the data
which the authors have assembled. While it cannot be said with assurance that
Court and Clinic are to be debited with the failures among these delinquents, since
others factors than their treatment may have been responsible for their post-treatment
behavior,' 8 neither can it be said with confidence that Court and Clinic are to be
institutions and authorities to aid the Court in enforcing the recommendations, limited
understanding or skill of some probation officers and social workers, paucity of necesary
community facilities, and experimental or unrealistic recommendations.
11. P. 151.
12. P. 152.
13. Pp. 162-7. See GLurcK AND GLUECe, op. cit. supra, note 2. The authors suggest
that the better record of the older offenders was due to the "influence of a post-adolescent
settling down" on their part. (p. 162). Assuming this factor to have accounted for some
of the difference, it does not follow that the record of the younger delinquents would
have been any worse if they had been treated in the same way as their elders rather
than by the more highly individualized processes of the juvenile court; and that, after all,




17. Pp. 169, 233.
18. Se pp. 177-181 and chapter XI. Cf. Mrcn= A. N-D ADLam, CnrE, LAw AD
SocIAL SczeNcE (1933) c. VI. It is difficult to believe that such sophisticated crimi-
nologists as the authors do not realize this, but it is not clear that they do. While they
say (p. 169) that the precise degree of effectiveness of a clinic and court cannot b deter-
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credited with the successes. The authors' conclusion that carrying out the Clinic's
recommendations exercised some influence on the reformation of these delinquents,
is open to grave question. By relating recidivism to a large number of factors in
the pre-treatment biographies of the delinquents, the authors discovered some sixty
factors which appeared to be favorable to reformation. They then classified the
entire group of delinquents (905) into four sub-classes according to the number
of favorable factors found in their biographies, and related recidivism to each sub-
class, obtaining a contingency coefficient of .28. Next, they made the same classi-
fication of those delinquents (162) who were treated according to the clinical
recommendations and related recidivism to each of these sub-classes, obtaining a
contingency coefficient of .39. They concluded that since the latter coefficient was
appreciably higher than the former, it was not alone the presence of the favorable
factors that was responsible for non-delinquency in the post-treatment period, but
also the execution of the clinical recommendations.10
Now it is to be observed that there was no control during the treatment and
post-treatment periods of the "favorable" or any other factors,2 0 or of the treat-
ment processes. For example, as the authors point out, probationary supervision
by one probation officer may be quite a different method of treatment from proba-
tionary supervision by another. Moreover, not only was the number of delinquents
who were treated according to clinical recommendations much smaller than the
entire group, but the number in each of the sub-classes of the first group was much
smaller than the corresponding sub-class of the second group. Only one of the
sub-classes of the first group contained more than 29 cases. It is significant that
while 8.7% of this sub-class of 103 failed to recidivate, 8.5% of the corresponding
sub-class of 577 of the second group likewise failed to recidivate. In short, in
the one instance in which the sub-classes compared each contained as many as 100
cases, the recidivism rate was practically the same for both. Finally, passing all
other questions regarding the validity and adequacy of the data subjected to statis-
tical treatment, it may well be doubted whether a coefficient of contingency pos-
sesses the significance which the authors attribute to it. Such a coefficient is a
symmetrical relationship which measures the interdependence of variables, but unless
there is knowledge of this relationship which is independent of the statistical meas-
urement of it, the measurement cannot be interpreted; 2 ' and here, of course, there
was no such independent knowledge.
Professor Adler and I recently published a book22 in which after surveying
criminological research we concluded that it had achieved no knowledge of the
causes of crime and delinquency or of the effects of treating criminals and delin-
quents in different ways, but only knowledge descriptive of them and of their
environment. We maintained that it is impossible to control crime and delinquency
except by chance without knowledge of its causes; that because of the great com-
plexity of the etiological problem, the descriptive knowledge which has been the
mined by post-treatment recidivism alone, since there are many other variables involved
in the treatment process which cannot be measured, apparently what they havo in mind
are values and not variables. "It must be remembered," they say, "that there are values
in the behavior clinic and juvenile court apart from their chief work of trying to rehabilitate
young delinquents."
19. P. 182. These correlations are described in detail in chapter X.
20. My colleague, Professor Wechsler, has pointed this out in his stimulating revive.
See (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1155.




fruit of criminological research is not capable of being significantly interpreted in
terms of common sense knowledge of human nature, the only knowledge now avail-
able for its interpretation; that it therefore lacks not only theoretical significance
but practical utility; that it can be employed only in trial and error efforts to
prevent crime and delinquency in which both failure and success are inexplicable.
For maintaining this thesis, we were soundly berated by criminologists.
Apparently, the authors agree with us, at least in part. Apparently, they agree
with our estimate of the present state of knowledge of both the causes and the
means of controlling crime and delinquency. They seem to agree that knowledge
of the causes of crime and delinquency is indispensable to their control, and that
we now possess only knowledge of the characteristics of a great many criminals
and delinquents.P They seem to agree that we can interpret this descriptive
knowledge, if at all, only by means of our common sense knowledge of human
nature.24 They seem to agree that we cannot in that way discover the causes of
crime and delinquency: "The degree to which any or all of the handicaps and
weaknesses of our boys may be regarded as causative of their delinquency cannot
be stated with assurance. '2 5  But they nevertheless appear to disagree with us
regarding the practical utility of descriptive knowledge of this sort: "A thorough
knowledge of the makeup of delinquents is of immediate, practical value."2  "A
descriptive account of the makeup of offenders is of value in the practical task of
understanding delinquent careers and determining upon modes of attack on the
problems they present."
27
Now it is not clear to me precisely what the authors mean by this. If they mean,
as I think they do, that knowledge descriptive of particular delinquents is of prac-
23. For example, they say at p. 281: "Despite many years of research and exp2riment,
scientifically valid knowledge of human mentality and motivation is as yet deddedly
meager.' And at p. 64: "To be sure, criminologists, clinicians, and probation and paro!e
officers have accumulated a certain array of data presumably significant in the etiology
of delinquent careers. But who can say with assurance that thee factors alone are
significant in causation and that there may not be others, as yet undiscovered, which
may prove to be of even more potent etiologic significance than any or all of the data
and theories at present within the purview of criminological research?" The answer is,
obviously, no one.
24. At p. 65 they say: "In criminological, as in medical or bacteriological, rematch,
the data unearthed through accurate observation and rational inference mu-t be accepteJ
as the best available at present." The question then becomes, in terms of what knowledg.a
are inferences to be drawn from the observed data? The authors seem to answer that
they are to be drawn in terms of our common experience of human nature, or, in any
event, of the experience of social workers and others having to do with problems of
delinquency and criminality, which, of course, is of the same sort as that of the rest of us
See pp. 63-4, 229-30.
25. They also say at p. 63: "Were the chief objective of this descriptive portion of
our study a determination of the causes of juvenile delinquency, the information would
not be complete, because of the lack of comparable data with respact to the general
population." But even if they had such data and were able to differentiate delinquents
from non-delinquents, they would not have solved the etiological problem. See McmICH r
AN ADLER, supra, note 18, at pp. 92-3.
26. P. 64.
27. P. 63. The authors also say at pp. 63-4: "A chief objective of juvenile courts
and clinics is to appraise the personal and social situation of each offender and to worl
out a program calculated to aid him in law-abiding and healthful living."
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tical value in the sense that without it we can make no efforts whatever to reform
them and that with it we can at least employ our common sense knowledge of
human nature in attempts at reforiiation; if they also mean, as I think they do,
that if we succeed in these trial and error efforts we will succeed by chance and
be unable to explain our successes, and that if we are informed and experienced
and wise, our chance of success will be somewhat greater; if, I say, they mean this,
there is no disagreement between us. But if they mean more than this, as they
sometimes appear to,28 then not only are we in disagreement but they are, as I
believe, refuted by their own researches. For here we have Cabot, who was cer-
tainly one of the wisest and most enlightened of juvenile court judges, and Healey
and Bronner, who are the most experienced and distinguished clinicians in the field
of juvenile delinquency, pooling their wisdom, their knowledge and their vast ex-
perience in an effort to reform delinquents with the net result that 88.2% continued
delinquent and 11.8% did not; and both they and we are utterly unable to explain
the result. We do not know why the failures failed or the successes succeeded. 2o
This review is already so long that I cannot discuss in any detail the authors'
conclusion, with which I agree, that we should nevertheless continue to employ
juvenile courts and clinics in the treatment of delinquency,30 or the reasons, with
which I agree only in part, that they give for their conclusion, or the suggestions,
which on the whole appear to me to be wise, that the authors make for the im-
provement of the court-clinic institution.31 Obviously, we maintain courts and
clinics not as ends in themselves, but as means to some ends which we wish to
achieve, and they can be justified only to the extent that they serve some and do
not disserve other socially desirable purposes. It seems to me that the authors'
research has made it difficult rationally to justify the continuance of juvenile courts
and clinics. If I understand them, they argue that juvenile courts and clinics serve
three ends chiefly: (1) they enlarge our knowledge, thus making it possible for us
to control delinquency and crime more effectively; (2) they contribute to the
development of more enlightened social attitudes toward the problems of delin-
quency and crime, thus making it possible to employ more flexible, more experimental
and more humane methods in the treatment of delinquents and criminals; and (3)
they prevent delinquency and crime by reforming delinquents to some extent.
Now, these are all socially desirable ends, so that the question is whether juvenile
courts and clinics are means well adapted to achieving them. With respect to the
first of them, I would say that whether or not we continue to maintain juvenile
courts and clinics, we must rid ourselves of the illusion that, merely by adding to
our descriptive knowledge of delinquents and criminals and by continuing our efforts
to interpret such knowledge significantly in terms of our common sense knowledge
of human nature, we can achieve the etiological knowledge which alone will enable
28. Thus, at p. 229 they say: "The etiological concept of antisocial behavior is difficult
and involved, and as a rule it is only in the individual case that the mechanism of this
etiology can be determined with any precision." But they immediately add: "All that
we can say is that the experience of social workers and others having to do with problems
of delinquency and criminality indicates that the more numerous the handicaps of the
kind above reviewed, the more difficult it is for the individual to adapt himself to socially
acceptable ways."
29. See also GLuEcx AxD GLUECx, op. cit. supra, note 2.
30. They also argue generally for the maintenance of the child guidance clinic on such
grounds as its utility in educating parents and teachers. However, I ghall confine myself
to a discussion of the clinic as an adjunct of the juvenile court. See pp. 236-241.
31. See chapter XIII.
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us to cope effectively with the problems of crime and delinquency. Unless we
cease to believe that we can solve the etiological problem by common sense ob-
servations and common sense inferences we s-hall never undertake the researches
which alone give promise of revealing to us the causes of delinquency and crime.
S -
There is little reason to believe that other clinicians will succeed where Healey and
Bronner have failed.
With respect to the second of these ends, I wonder what the average man will
think of attempts to reform rather than to incapacitate delinquents when he learns
of the criminal record of this group of delinquents after their treatment by the
outstanding juvenile court in the country, a record which included 666 larcenies,
362 burglaries, 41 robberies, 4 homicides, 164 assaults and other breaches of the
peace, besides many less serious offenses.P3 It is barely possible that his attitude
towards the problems of delinquency and crime may be less enlightened, if by
enlightenment is meant that the exclusive preoccupation of juvenile courts and
clinics should be the reformation of the individual delinquent. In any event, it
seems fairly clear that if we are to continue juvenile courts and clinics we should
insist that judges and clinicians recognize that the reformation of the individual
delinquent is not their ultimate end, but only a means to the more remote end of the
protection of society against the results of delinquency and crime. In their zeal
for reformation and "scientifically administered justice ' 34 they should not expose
society to too great risks. They should make a more determined effort to distin-
guish between the incorrigible or less promising cases and the corrigible or more
promising cases, and they should not hesitate to incapacitate the former, even at the
risk of being accused of administering justice mechanically, while they try to reform
the latter.
With respect to the last of these ends, I can add little to what I have already
said. Even if it be assumed that juvenile courts and clinics reform delinquents
to some extent and thus prevent some delinquency, I should like to point out that
delinquency and crime can be prevented by the incapacitation as well as by the
reformation of actual offenders, and by the deterrence of potential offenders. If
our purpose is to prevent as much delinquency and crime as we can, we will seek
to reform rather than to incapacitate or deter only if we know, or have reason
to believe, that attempts to reform have greater preventive efficacy than attempts
to incapacitate or deter. Before the authors began their research we had little
reason to believe that the preventive efficacy of the non-punitive methods of treat-
ment, which are directed at reformation, is greater than that of the punitive methods
which are aimed at incapacitation and deterrence; now that they have finished
their research, I should say that we have even less reason to believe in their greater
preventive efficacy. But a juvenile court which employed punitive methods to
incapacitate and deter as well as non-punitive methods to reform would largely
lose its distinctive character as a children's court.
In short, it seems to me that in the present state of knowledge we can rationally
justify the continuance of juvenile courts and clinics only by reference to the
alternative methods of dealing with delinquent children which are now available to
us; and that is to say that we can justify their continuance rationally only on
'humanitarian grounds. The rest must be a matter of faith rather than of reason-
of faith that in some mysterious way the devotion, the zeal, the kindliness, and
the wisdom of Cabots and Healey and Bronners will some day work wonders.
New York City. Jr.no=x MacH %.t
32. See MBcHAELAm ALEm, op. cit. supra, note 18, at chapters IV, VIII.
33. P. 155.
34. P. 241.
tProfessor of Law, Columbia University.
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MODEL LAWS FOR PLANNING CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES. By Edward M. Bas-
sett, Frank B. Williams, Alfred Bettman, and Robert Whitten. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press. 1935. pp. viii, 137.
THE editors of the Harvard City Planning Studies have maintained their high stand-
ards of research in this very useful volume, which is the seventh of the series of
studies. Planning legislation before 1925 was rather sketchy and groping; but
it represented fairly the trial and error planning decade in which planners were con-
sulters and persuaders, rarely militant reformers. The New York Planning Acts of
1926 and 1927 were the first attempts by general law to define the planning field
for cities, towns and villages, and the relation of the planning agency to legislative
and executive functions of municipal government. By that time the planners knew
better what they wanted and the work of the legislative craftsmen was carefully
executed. The Acts are being profitably used by several municipalities in New York
State. In 1924 and 1927 the so-called Standard Zoning and Planning Acts were
produced by a Committee appointed by Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Com-
merce. At least twelve states have since passed enabling acts either closely follow-
ing or largely influenced by the Standard Planning Act, and thirty-five states have
used the Standard Zoning Act in the same way.
There were differences of opinion in the Hoover Committee, not over the ob-
jectives of planning, but over the ways to attain them. The New York Acts were
quite good enough for some members of the Committee who were content to pro-
ceed cautiously and were opposed to giving legislators or judges more than they
could safely digest. Others of the Committee were sure that experience had justified
the planning techniques and procedures as a proper exercise of the police power.
They were ready to have them all embodied in legislation and tested by the courts.
Both these viewpoints are wisely preserved in the Harvard volume. Of the four
collaborators, Edward M. Bassett and Frank Williams, both of the New York Bar
and with long experience in the law of planning and in the drafting of statutes,
have followed the New York planning laws in their model acts; Alfred Bettman
of the Ohio Bar has insisted that more effective control over development should
be lodged in the planning agency, and has used the Standard Planning Act as the
basis for his forms. Robert Whitten, although not trained in the law, contributes
the viewpoint of the thorough student of planning and of one who has acted as a
planning practitioner under many state laws. He would have the procedure in
zoning and subdivision control all a part of the planning process, and would expand
the field of planning regulation somewhat beyond the limits provided in the forms
presented either by Mr. Bettman or by Messrs. Bassett and Williams.
The discussions which accompany the legal forms contain the planning philosophy
of each of the collaborators, and the justification for the differences in their drafts.
Moreover, these discussions define the planning process and the function of the
planning commission in a most illuminating way not found in other texts.
Mr. Bettman sees city planning as a "method or technique whereby the structures
placed on and the uses made of the land within a city or urban area may be given
a high degree of harmony or mutual adjustment, that is, a degree of design which
recognizes and reflects the interrelationships of these various structures and uses."
The other collaborators have no quarrel with this definition, or with the conclusion
that the planning process obviously requires the making of a general plan with an
agency to interpret it and to harmonize the many public and private projects with
it. Just how the planning agency shall be constituted gives Mr. Bettman some
concern. He feels certain that the agency should be detached from the legislative
and administrative functions of municipal government, since its primary purpose
[Vol. 44
1935] BOOK REVIEWS
is to influence decisions of various legislative and administrative officials or bodies
having charge of the actual location, extent, and construction of various types of
public works. This planning agency or department should bear the same relation-
ship to the chief executive and to the chief legislative body of the municipality
as the research or planning department of a railroad or great manufacturing enter-
prise bears to the president and board of directors thereof.
From this point on the collaborators travel different roads to their goals. Air.
Bettman would give legal status to the master plan as soon as it is adopted by the
planning agency. Thereafter, all projects which affect the plan would be submitted,
in the first instance, to the planning agency, and these projects, if disapproved by
the planning agency, would go into the discard unless the governing board of the
municipality saw fit to approve them by a more than majority vote. Mir. Bassett
and Mr. Williams are opposed to the suspensive veto power of the planning com-
mission and insist that any plan, to be binding, must be adopted by the legislative
body of the municipality.
The experience in Cincinnati justifies Mr. Bettman's reasoning. For at least tea
years a planning commission there has protected successfully the integrity of a city
plan. Experience in New York cities, however, provides a like justification for the
reasoning of Mr. B'assett and Mr. Williams. The legislative forms based on either
theory are greatly, to be preferred over the many state statutes and local ordinances
under which planning commissions are now operating.
The National Planning Board (now the National Resources Board), in its review
of city and regional planning in the United States, published in May of 1934, found
1,241 cities with zoning ordinances, and 739 cities and 61 counties with planning
boards. Seventy-five per cent of the zoned cities had ordinances that sadly needed
revision. An unknown but large percentage of the planning agencies were set up
under ordinances which crippled their effectiveness. In addition to these local
units for zoning and planning, the state has entered the planning field, and for
more than a year planning agencies in forty-two states have been operating, for the
most part without the authority of state legislation. The practical solution in the
planning field is probably for each state to mold its legislation as experience in that
state has dictated, and in this process the Harvard volume will be indispensable.
F.A~VEL SHMnTLM~.t
New York City.
SEcuRiTi SpEcuLAvioN. By John T. Flynn. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com-
pany. 1934. pp. xii, 332.f
TmIs is not only a fascinating book but an important contribution to the science
of economics. Its merits reflect the well-known talents of the author. In the firnt
place the subject is a vital one. To me, economists can be classified according to the
themes that occupy their pens. There are those who write about things that count.
And there are those who don't. There are those who approach economic science with
the attitude of a good physician, that is to say, they wish to make their efforts count
in a tangible advancement of an economic order in which the lot of the average man
will be improved. Then there are those who devote a whole life time to comparing
the economics of Ricardo with Mills, who rack their cerebral centers to find new ways
tSecretary, National Conference on City Planning.
,The reviewer, who is a government official, prefers to remain anonymous.
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to add two and two, with the aid of charts and graphs, or who refine index numbers
to twenty decimal places by the application of physics, astronomy and psychology.
Such pedants sink the energy of many years into a fat tome the conclusions of which,
even if concededly accurate, hold out no more gain to the life of Jones or Smith or
Barnes than the wedding rites of Chief Wumba Wumba of the Upper Congo.
Security Speculation is brilliantly written. A very complicated subject matter,
thanks to the alchemic rhetoric and imagery of the author, dissolves into elementary
and understandable propositions. Mr. Flynn is one of the few economists who can
tell a layman what all the shooting is about. This talent does not commend him
always to his professional brethren. For the directors of the economic guild have
for many years frowned on a brother who explained too clearly just what he was
talking about. The usual punishment visited upon such heretics is to label them
journalists and pronounce them superficial. Alas, medieval schoolmen are still very
much with us. Only the other day a Washington economist prepared a report, which
was saturated with so many technical terms and such involved sentences that it
would have tried the patience of Job to grasp it. I suggested that the report be sim.
plified. "If you do that," he retorted, "the report will be unimpressive. We cannot
afford to let the uninitiated think that economics is EASY."
Another noteworthy Flynn trait, found in Security Speculation, is the recognition
of the actual performances of the economic man. Many economists, who get off to
a good start by selecting a subject worthy of the pains of investigation, make the mis.
take of not getting close enough to the realities of the problem. The consequence is
that they build their theory on quick-sand facts. The value of an institution depends
not on what it was supposed to be constructed for, but on the use to which it is
actually being put. One may build a hospital, but if it is operated by quacks the
theory that it is a useful institution must be abandoned. A few years ago a dis-
tinguished professor wrote an article for one of our leading magazines extoling in.
vestment trusts. He described very well the uses to which such institutions could be
put, but failed to take into account the actual use to which they were being put. In.
deed, he became so careless that he assumed that the facts fitted his conclusions,
Many business men are great lovers of the technique of masquerade. They are rare
workers in the art of camouflage, often putting monastic facades on Ali Baba caves.
When this is accomplished, they are very glad to have the academic economist praise
the facade, but are in great umbrage, even to the point of favoring a Hitler censor-
ship over the pens and tongues of professors, if one is arrant enough to peek into
the cave. And if the academic economist is not there to perceive only the facade,
the professional propagandist is soon in the business of diverting suspicion. Flynn
is always at his best when he tears down facades. His ability to reveal what is actu.
ally going on in the world of business, to track down the countless ingenuities of ac-
quisitive men for fooling the public and often the professor as to the real nature of
their activities, is one of the reasons why he has climbed so high in reputation during
the last decade. In fact, the man Flynn has become so useful, and therefore dangerous,
as an economist, that he has for a number of years been a target for fabricated criti-
cism. Many professors do not like him because he writes so charmingly, tackles such
big problems, thinks so clearly and can convey his thoughts to the lay mind. Many
business men do not like him because he is frightfully impious about false whiskers,
because he abhors sham and pretence and will not let a body make a dishonest penny
out of beautiful propaganda.
And so they go on whispering that the man Flynn is completely unjudicial, and
merely talks through his hat. Such critics may well bear this in mind. Perhaps
no man in the 20th century has written so prolificly about business, and certainly
none has written such dangerous articles about dishonest business-stories that ex-
[Vol. 44
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posed the mismanagement of such huge sums that the slightest slip on the facts
would have wrecked Mr. Flynn financially. Yet Mr. Flynn is the only important
critic of business that I know of who has never been sued for libel!
Security Speculation devotes itself to one central and controversial theme, and to
two collateral and uncontroversial ones. The central theme is whether speculation
is an asset or liability to our economic order. The mere raising of this issue shows
the daring and originality of the author. For many years stock speculation has been
one of the most acquiesced-in folkways of our civilization. Occasionally in the
writings of a few professors the insinuation would slip out that some speculation might
be nothing more than poker playing with shares of stock for chips. Such insinua-
tions, however, were only the personal opinions of the writers. None of them bestirred
themselves to make a thorough investigation of this very important problem. These
meager opinings, of course, had no effect on public opinion, being completely over-
shadowed by the high powered publicity of the New York Stock Exchange, which
sometimes makes one wonder whether haloes and angel wings have not been out-
moded as symbols of the perfect good. ir. Flynn smashes much of this propaganda.
Those who defend speculation say that it is necessary for a continuous market,
and that a continuous market is necessary for the procuring of new money for in-
dustry. Flynn shatters this contention by showing that the great bulk of fresh funds
for industry have been raised in either one of three other ways: sales of securities
through underwriters, financing of corporations out of surplus earnings, or govern-
ment loans and gifts. While it is true that sometimes a new issue of stocks or bonds
is distributed to investors through listing on an exchange, this is very exceptional. A
large percentage of all stock exchange transactions do not put a nickel into the coffers
of corporations, but merely represent the transfer of shares from one owner to an-
other. New capital for industry is almost exclusively raised off of exchanges rather
than on them.
Another defense of speculation is that investors would not invest in new issues
of stocks or bonds if these issues did not possess the advantage of being listed on an
exchange. Flynn points out that new issues are practically never admitted to listing
privileges at the time they are being sold to the public. Listing occurs after such
issues have been sold, and there is no way that one can be sure that an issue, after
it has been bought, will ever be listed. Furthermore, listed stock or bonds do not
possess an incomparable advantage over investments which do not enjoy the "liquid-
ity" which such listing is supposed to give. There are billions of dollars invested in
real estate bonds and mortgages. This type of investment is highly unliquid. There
are many more billions invested in stocks and bonds that have never been listed on
any exchange.. In the United States there are hundreds of thousands of issues of
stocks and bonds. Yet only some 7,000 of these are actually listed on any exchange.
As a matter of truth, there may be much more capital invested in securities which
have no listing advantages than in those which are traded in on the exchanges.
One other important argument in defense of speculation, also considered, is that
professional speculators, presumably very intelligent gentlemen with a wizard-like
knowledge of basic investment values, keep stock prices within reasonable bounds.
Thus the "big board" becomes an investment chart for investors. The effect of this,
it is alleged, guides new capital into profitable fields. It is inconceivable that anyone
could believe that professional speculators fix stock prices at reasonable levels, if
one has a memory that can think back only a few years ago. Flynn agrees that the
professionals "fix" prices, but he seriously doubts whether the professional has any
interest in keeping stock prices within bounds. Only a child or an economist for an
exchange would disagree with this.
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Flynn's challenge to the long standing and highly propagandized contention that
stock exchanges play a vital role in the financing of industry is a real service. In the
chapter of his book entitled, Wall Street-The Debt Machine, he casts another pearl.
Flynn shows that stock exchanges, far from aiding the financing of industry, often
actually are used to overburden a corporation with debt. Before the passage of the
Securities Exchange Act it was customary for many of our leading investment bankers
to buy up a new issue of stock from corporation officials who participated in the gain
which followed. These corporation insiders would sell the stock at say $20 a share
to their allies, the investment bankers. Then the bankers would employ a stoc
market manipulator to whip the price of the stock up on an exchange until it
touched say $50 a share. At this price or even higher it would then be unloaded on
investors totally unaware of the fictitiousness of its value. The net result: these in-
vestors bought $50 of ownership claims against a corporation that received only $20
of their money. Thirty dollars, therefore, of claims against the income of a cor-
poration were saddled on a corporation that had not received this money,
One collateral theme of Flynn's book deals with the manipulative and deceptive
devices employed on exchanges by professional "insiders" to trap public buyers into
purchasing stock at tragic prices, and with an analysis of the advantage in the game
of speculation which exchange members enjoy over the bucolic outsider. His con-
tention is that, if we must have stock speculation, the exchange member who can
trade from the floor of an exchange where he has an immediate view of the course of
the market, and often access to inside information, should be deprived of these boons.
Speculation by the public may be bad, say the author, but it is not nearly so bad as
the brand of professional speculation staged by exchange members. Speculation by
exchange members, he believes, should be abolished; all brokers on an exchange should
confine themselves to executing orders for outside customers and be prohibited from
trading on their own account, which so frequently means trading against the orders
of these customers.
If there is any weak spot in Security Speculation, it is that the author does not
notice the argument that speculation is necessary to afford a ready market for har-
assed investors who must liquidate their investments. If speculation were forbidden,
an honest investor might have to wait a week or two weeks or perhaps longer for a
buyer. I am sure that the author knows the answer to this contention, and I am
sorry that he did not give it. It is a gap in a train of argument that is truly im-
pressive. The omission does not seriously weaken his case, but his case would have
been stronger for having considered it.
The conclusion of Security Speculation makes an appraisal of the Securities Ex-
change Act. The author feels that the act will be no stronger than the economic
philosophy of the five commissioners appointed to administer it. In the original act
Congress made definite decisions on many important matters that in the final act
were left to the discretion of the Commission. The author thinks, therefore, that
whether the act will really deal in a sound and constructive way with the many abuses,
of stock exchanges still remains to be seen. This is a fair conclusion.
Security Speculation should appeal to the professor who has never done any think-
ing about stock exchanges. For it must be admitted, I believe, that Flynn has in
the main given a masterful analysis of a much befogged and long neglected issue.
And to the millions of investors, who lost billions on stock exchanges under the ol&d
regime, as well as to the great lay public in general, the book will be a real treat.
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-INLAND MA-NE INsUtRANcE. By Earl Appleman. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co. 1934. pp. xi, 221.
IF o.sx dare speak so lightly of any kind of legal treatise, he might say that
this is a charming little book. The author writes con amore. When looked squarely
in the face, the inland marine policy does not seem very lovely, but nevertheless
the author loves it, and so writes zestfully the first treatise to be published on
the subject. And a very readable treatise it is, too.
As already intimated, inland marine insurance is a newcomer in the field of in-
surance. It is also something of a fraud, and the name a huge misnomer, for
almost the only thing marine about this form of insurance is that it is written
by marine insurance companies. It should be called transportation insurance, for
that is what it is. In fact when, in 1933, the Insurance Commissioners of the
several states met in convention assembled to pontificate solemnly over the new
arrival, they adopted regulations governing "marine and/or transportation policies."
The process by which this type of insurance, covering every imaginable sort of
risk arising out of inland transportation of goods, came to the marine companies
rather than to the fire and casualty companies, which soon began to look hungrily
at it, is interesting. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, sea-borne trans-
portation was the only kind of sufficient importance to receive much attention from
underwriters. Early marine policies covered shipments "at and from" the port of
departure "to" the port of destination, that is, while on shipboard. If the shipper
-wished protection against wharf and lighter risks before lading, or after unloading,
he was forced to seek other underwriters, who were not available. Due to the
pressure for more adequate coverage, the marine underwriters extended the pro-
tection of their policies to shipments from the time of leaving the shipper's port
warehouse until actually received by the consignee at the port of destination. With
the rapid improvement of the facilities for inland transportation that came with
the development of railways, and later of automobiles, the volume and importance
of land traffic mounted rapidly. The next step of the marine underwriters was
natural. They extended the coverage of their policies to shipments from inland
points of origin until delivered in good safety, after the sea voyage, to an inland
point of destination. The intervening marine carriage was easily dropped out, and
the marine underwriters found themselves insuring goods in transit from one inland
point to another, with not even a whiff of sea air en route. From this vantage
point the marine underwriters spread rapidly their occupation of the new field
They began to insure any kind of goods on the move or goods that might be
affected by change of location. This practice has given rise to the cloud of "floater"
policies that now fill the air. Thus a jewelry "floater" will protect madame in case
of loss of her earring at the ball, or her wristwatch at the country club, or her
necklace on the Riviera. The tourist "floater" insures the luggage or other travel
equipment of the traveler nearly everywhere he may go. But it has been solemnly
adjudged that under such a policy the underwriter is not responsible for the loss
of the tourist's false teeth.
This new line of insurance fell to the marine underwriters because they were
prepared for it through their experience with transportation risks, but the lagging
fire and casualty insurers soon woke up to the possibilities of the new business
and demanded a share in it. There followed angry disputes which were finally
settled by a peace treaty sponsored by the National Convention of Insurance Com-
missioners, to which reference has already been made, and the territory to be
occupied by the marine underwriters, when they came on dry land, was carefully
outlined pursuant to this treaty by regulations promulgated by the Insurance Com-
missioners of the several states.
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If one has any doubt about the parentage of this new form of insurance, he
need only look on the face of the policy prepared for standard use by the I. M. U. A.
(Inland Marine Underwriter's Association). It is unmistakably descended from
the old Lloyd's marine policy, which Sir James Mansfield declared "a very strange
instrument," and Buller, J. denounced as "absurd and incoherent."1  It is true that
the I. M. U. A. policy incorporates a few of the provisions of standard fire and
casualty policies, but its most conspicuous effort at modernization is to take on
an overload of "and/or's;" and seldom has that abomination been used so need-
lessly. Aside from these new features, such as they are, the policy is full of
provisions unwisely harsh, contrary to accepted law or ambiguously expressed. As
an example of ambiguity, paragraph fourteen of the policy may be cited. What
the draftsman intended to say was this: If the premium remains unpaid for sixty
days after the effective date of the policy, the operation of the insurance contract
shall thereafter be suspended while such premium remains unpaid. What is written
in the policy is this: "Cancellation by Non-Payment of Premium. It is a condition
of this policy that if the premium be not paid within sixty days from the date
of attaching this policy shall be null and void during the time the premium is past
due and unpaid."
But whatever may be the quality of this policy contract, when our author looked
upon it, it seemed to him good and he proceeded cheerfully to comment upon Its
several provisions with judgment, clarity and seeming approval. He does observe
that paragraph sixteen is contrary to the law as determined by statute or judicial
decision in practically all American jurisdictions, but that seems to cause him
little pain.
The author's preface disclaims any intent to present a treatise on the general
law of insurance. Therefore we should not complain unduly of an occasional in-
accuracy in the text, as for example, when the author makes no distinction between
the consequences of misstatement and non-disclosure of a material fact when inno-
cently made by the insured; 2 or when he fails to make the subtle and elusive
distinction between waivers and estoppels in insurance law.3 As a satisfactory and
readable commentary on inland marine insurance and its queer policy contracts,
the book deserves high praise.
WILLIAm R. VANCE~f
New Haven, Connecticut.
AUDITING, THEORY AND PRACTIcE. Fifth Edition. By Robert H. Montgomery.
New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1934. pp. viii, 772.
SINCE the only concise method of picturing a "business" is by means of financial
statements, the importance of the procedure which makes possible such statements
has increased ratably with the size and complexity of business relations. With the
increased utilization of the corporate device, the financial statement has been seized
upon by legislatures as one means of control. Statutes now require their filing for
administrative use; 1 for public reference; 2 or As a condition precedent to the issue
1. Brough v. Whitmore, 4 T. R. 206, 210 (1791).
2. P. 63.
3. P. 92.
tProfessor of Law, Yale University.
1. E.g., for the Federal Income Tax.
2. MAss. GFN. LAws (1932) .c. 156, §§ 36, 47.
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of securities, 3 or to continued trading in outstanding securities.
4 Until recently
little or no attention has been paid either to the possibilities or the limitations of such
statements as presentations of the "position of the business."5 Frequently, a single
form is provided for all reporting corporations, and this has proved far too simple for
general use.6 Nor have such statutes always required verification of filed state-
ments by others than the corporate managers. Recent statutes and regulations
thereunder lay more stress on the necessity for flexibility and for independent verifi-
cation; 7 and it is probable that state laws will eventually require verified or "audited"
statements to be filed.
To make intelligent use of audited statements, it is necessary to be familiar with
rules of "good accounting practice"; with the scope of the usual audit procedure;
and with the conditions which a financial statement does not reveal. The present
edition of Auditing, Theory and Practice can well be used to become familiar with
each of the above problems. Although primarily intended for the professional
auditor, the style is sufficiently clear and intelligible to meet the needs of business
managers and lawyers seeking information on the proper use of balance sheets and
income statements.
Careful reading of the first and last few chapters will throw much light on just
what an auditor does do, and what he mnight reasonably be asked to do. It is gen-
erally recognized that an independently "audited" statement is more %-aluable, and
more likely to be a fair disclosure of position than one prepared by the managers
themselves. All too frequently the extent of the auditor's actual verification (as
disclosed by his certificate) is overlooked. This obviously becomes of importance
if one seeks to affix liability for misstatements. 8 Where the question is one of the
reasonableness of an expert's investigation,
9 the opinion of an expert accountant, such
as Mr. Montgomery, is of particular value.' 0
The majority of the chapters are given over to discussions of classes of balance
sheet and income items. Most interesting to lawyers are those on Fixed Assets,
Capital and Surplus, and Contingent Liabilities.11 If one expected to find an ad-
3. CoaxN. Gu,. STAT. (1930) § 4062; Securities Act, § 7, and Schedule A, Items 25 and
26, 48 STAT. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (a) et seq. (1933).
4. Securities Exchange Act, § 12 (b) (1), I, J, K, and § 13, P. L. No. 291, 73d Cong,
2d Sess. (1934) tit. I.
5. Securities Exchange Act, § 13 (b): "The Commission may prescribe ... the form or
forms in which the required information shall be set forth, the items or details to he
shown... and the methods to be followed in the preparation of reports, in the appraLsl
or valuation of assets and liabilities, in the determination of depreciation and dep!etion, in
the differentiation of recurring and non-recurring income, . . ."; and see § 13 (C).
6. Cf. the printed form under the Massachusetts statute, supra note 2; Empire Labora-
tories, Inc., v. Golden Distributing Corp., 266 Blss. 418, 164 N. E. 772 (1929); United
Oil Co. v. Eager Transportation Co., 273 Bass. 375, 173 N. E. 692 (1930).
7. Required by Securities Act, Schedule A, item 25, and Securities Exchange Act, § 13
(a) (2): "Such annual reports, certified if required by the rules and regulations of the
commission by independent public accountants, and such quarterly reports, as the Com-
mission may prescribe", and see § 12 (b) (1), I, J of the latter statute.
8. See Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N. E. 803 (1934).
9. Securities Act, § 11 (b) (3), B.
10. Robert H. Montgomery is a partner in the accounting firm of Lybrand, Roza
Brothers and ,"ontgomery, and is the author of various texts on federal tax practice.
11. The consideration of these items, and particularly of contingent liabilities, generally
discloses clues to the somewhat intangible difference between a good financial statement
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vanced discussion of "principles" the volume is disappointing;1 2 but the clear state-
ments of "accepted" practice, used as the basis for discussion, offer an attractive
method of familiarizing the uninitiated with what is "normally to be expected."
In contrast, some general problems are ably presented and critically considered.1I
The most regrettable feature, from the reviewer's point of view, is the failure to,
annotate or consider in detail the problems involved in preparing statements to meet
the requirements of the Securities Act "of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.14 Mr. Montgomery's reaction to these questions would have been most
welcome.
New Haven, Connecticut. WILLIAM W. WERNTZ.f
Correction of Professor Nussbaum's review of LAMBERT, UN PAPIR DE JURIS-
PRUDENCE ComPARATIvE, reviewed in (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 720.
PROFESSOR Nussbaum desires to call attention to the fact that the concluding lines
of the first paragraph, reading "which may interest American readers both for Its
subject matter and for the manner in which it discloses the personality of its
author", should have read, "which may interest American readers both for its sub-
ject matter and because of the personality of its author".
and a good (or bad) investment appraisal. See LAssER A-w GERARDi, Fr.ALr. SEcunIn=s
Acr PROCEDURE (1934) c. 6, and the present volume reviewed, c. 17, especially at 373-383.
12. Thus very little is said regarding write downs and depreciationt except to present
the cost theory. See pp. 281, 545; but the book is on "Auditing," not on "Accounting
Theory."
13. For example, the discussions of dividends (p. 437 et seq.) and net income (p. 469
et seq.).
14. The Act is merely quoted, at p. 724. Detailed regulations are, of course, incom-
plete as yet.
tInstructor in Accounting, Yale University; Associate, Yale School of Law.
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